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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellant Arvil A. Harris ("Harris") appeals a final Decision, Order on Supplemental
Findings, and Judgment and Decree Granting Specific Performance of the Eighth Judicial
District Court of Duchesne County, State of Utah in favor of Appellee Joseph W. Shields
("Shields"). The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1995).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND THE STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue #1
Whether the trial court erred in specifically enforcing a real estate option where the
purchaser failed to make a valid tender of the purchase price, as required under Utah law.

Standard of Review and Preservation
of the Issue for Issue #1
The first issue should be reviewed for correctness because "when the trial court has based
its rulings upon a misunderstanding and misapplication of the law, where a correct one would
have produced a different result, the party adversely affected is entitled to have the error
rectified in a proper adjudication under correct principles of law." Reed v. Alvey. 610 P.2d
1374, 1377 (Utah 1980).
This issue was preserved for appeal in the Bench Trial Tr. (hereafter "Tr.") at 182-8;
204-08; 294-95.

Issue #2
Whether the trial court erred in decreeing that Shields could exercise his option on or
before "the expiration of the real property lease," contrary to the terms of the option.

Standard of Review and Preservation
of the Issue for Issue #2
The second issue should be determined under a "correction of error" standard because
"[i]f a contract is unambiguous, interpretation of the contract is a question of law, which we
review for correctness." Edwards & Daniels Architects. Inc. v. Farmers' Properties. Inc.. 865
P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
This issue did not have to be raised at trial because the Plaintiff did not seek, as part of
his requested relief, specific performance contrary to the terms of the contract. This issue first
arose when the trial court entered its final judgment decreeing performance contrary to the
contract terms.

DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
None
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
Harris appeals a final judgment and decree of the Honorable John R. Anderson of the
Eighth Judicial District Court of Duchesne County, State of Utah granting specific performance
of a real estate option against Harris. This action arises under common law.
Harris will show that Shields was not entitled to an award of specific performance of the
Option To Buy where (1) Shields failed to make a valid tender of the purchase price, which
includes an unconditional offer of payment of the money due, together with the actual production
of the money or its equivalent, as required for specific performance; (2) the evidence does not
show that tender would have been futile; and (3) the trial court ordered specific performance
inconsistent with the parties' agreement. Therefore, this Court should find that the trial court
committed error in decreeing specific enforcement of the Option To Bu> and deny Shields
specific performance.

B. Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below
Shields brought an action against Harris to compel specific performance of a real estate
option. The parties presented evidence and argument at a bench trial on October 17 and 18,
1994. After hearing the evidence, the trial court took the matter under advisement and then
issued its Decision on October 24, 1994. The trial court clarified its Decision by an Order on
Supplemental Findings, dated June 22, 1995, and also issued a Judgment and Decree Granting
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Specific Performance of the same date. The trial court held that the Option To Buy is definite,
valid, and enforceable; determined the sales price to be $202,125.00, less all credits and liens;
and did not require Shields to tender the purchase amount. The Judgment also required Harris
to sell his property to Shields at a closing date as prayed for by Shields or prior to expiration
of "the real property lease."
Harris appealed the trial court's decision to the Utah Supreme Court, which transferred
the matter to the Utah Court of Appeals. Harris now asks this Court to reverse the trial court
and deny specific performance of the option to convey real estate.

C. Statement of Facts
Harris is the owner of 320 acres of real property, including water shares and an irrigation
system, located in Pleasant Valley, Duchesne County, State of Utah. (Real Property Lease dated
May 1, 1987, Add., Doc. 2.) Shields is the owner of real property located three miles away
from Harris' property. (Tr. at 98.)
Harris, as lessor, and Shields, as lessee, entered into a five-year real property lease on
April 1, 1985. (Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law at 1, 1 1, Add., Doc. 4.) After the
parties entered into the lease, Harris made substantial improvements on the property, at his own
expense, in the form of a renovated irrigation system.
Conclusions of Law at 1, 1 1, Add., Doc. 4.)
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(Tr. at 116; Findings of Fact &

On or about February 10, 1987, the parties mutually agreed to terminate the 1985 lease
because Harris was interested in selling the property or in obtaining a longer term lease, and
Shields was interested in purchasing the property or in having a longer term lease. (Tr. at 156;
Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law at 2, 1 2, Add., Doc. 4.) As an incentive to induce
Shields to enter into a longer-term lease or purchase the property, Harris executed an "Option
To Buy," in writing, on February 12, 1987, and delivered it to Shields. (Tr. at 157-59.) The
option proposed a new seven-year lease and an option to buy at any time during the seven years.
The terms of the option are as follows:
A. Lessee, Joseph W. Shields would have this Special option to buy said ranch
from Lessor Arvil A. Harris for a reasonable price to be negotiated by five
independent people, one man from the Federal land Bank, one man from the Soil
Conservation Service in Roosevelt, Utah office, one banker from the First
Security Bank of Utah loan department, Roosevelt Utah, one farmer in the
Myton, Utah area, and one real estate broker in the Myton or Roosevelt area.
These five people would make a fair study at the time of purchase to make an
honest and fair appraisal of the ranch. All five bids would be added up for a
grand total and divided by five to arrive at a selling price.
B. A special consideration would be given to Joseph W. Shields in that
$5,000.00 per year would be given toward the down payment at any year during
the course of the seven year lease. For example, if you choose to buy the
seventh year of the lease $35,000.00 would be allowed as a down payment
toward the purchase price of said ranch. Said price of the ranch would be based
on the appraisal of the five people mentioned in Paragraph A. If for example,
the average of these five appraisals came to $300,000.00, then you could apply
the $35,000.00 as part of the down payment. The balance due would be
$265,000.00.
(Option To Buy, Addendum, Doc. 1.)
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On February 20, 1987, Shields filed a Chapter 12 Plan of Reorganization in the United
States Bankruptcy Court. (Tr. at 126-34.) After the dismissal of the Chapter 12 proceedings,
approximately 90 days after it was filed, Harris and Shields entered a ten-year lease, which
began on May 1, 1987 through May 1, 1997, with annual payments of $13,000.00. (Real
Property Lease dated May 1, 1987, Add., Doc. 2; Tr. at 148-50.)
The ten-year lease, executed in May of 1987, does not make any reference to the sevenyear option, executed in February of 1987; nor does the Option to Buy refer to the ten-year
lease. (Option To Buy, Add., Doc 1; Real Property Lease dated May 1, 1987, Add., Doc. 2;
Tr. at 140.)

Furthermore, Shields never discussed the Option to Buy with Harris, nor

communicated whether he accepted or rejected the option until 1993. (Tr. at 158, 176-77.)
Shields commenced farming the leased land and made all payments to Harris pursuant
to the terms of the lease. (Tr. at 112-14; 169.) In the spring of 1993, Harris approached
Shields and told him that Harris was going to sell the property to Burton Dairy, and Harris
offered to buy out the remainder of Shield's lease.

(Tr. at 142-43.) In response, Shields

decided to attempt to exercise the Option To Buy to prevent Harris from selling the property to
someone else and sought the assistance of legal counsel to enforce it. (Tr. at 143-44.) Pursuant
to the terms of the Option to Buy, Shields obtained four appraisals; he was unsuccessful in
obtaining the fifth appraisal from the Soil Conservation District.

(Tr. at 145-46, 182-83.)

Shields obtained these appraisals without telling, consulting with, or cooperating with Harris.
(Tr. at 144-46.) After obtaining the appraisals, Shields had his attorney prepare and mail a
6

letter, dated August 2, 1993, to Harris' attorney, which communicated Shields' intention to
exercise the option. (Tr. at 177-81.) Based on the appraisals he obtained, Shields asserted that
the sale price should be $134,200.00. (Complaint, R. at 6.) Although Shields asserted that he
was ready, willing, and able to purchase Harris' property, Shields never did produce or pay any
of the purchase money. (Tr. at 146, 183-84.)
Although the option did not require the parties to cooperate in selecting appraisers or
specify who was to select the appraisers, after Harris learned that Shields obtained appraisals,
Harris procured two appraisals. (Tr. at 167-69.)
The trial court found that "Shields was not required to tender the purchase price under
the facts and circumstances of this case because the formula for finalizing the purchase price
could not be completed without the cooperation of both parties as specifically set forth in the
Option To Buy agreement." (Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law at 4, 1 17, Add., Doc.
4.) However, the trial court did not order the parties to cooperate in selecting appraisers to
value the property. Rather, the trial court averaged an appraisal by a neighbor Shield's selected
with an appraisal by a neighbor Harris selected to determine one of the required appraised
values. (Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law at 5, 119(a), Add., Doc. 4.) The trial court
did not adhere to the formula set forth in the option in determining this averaged appraisal value.
(Option To Buy, Add., Doc. 1.)
The trial court found that the terms of the option were definite, concluded that the Option
To Buy is valid and enforceable, and ordered Harris to sell the real property to Shields for a
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purchase price of $202,125.00, less credits and liens, and provide good and marketable title.
(Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law at 4, 1 13; 7-8, 112, 6, Add., Doc. 4; J. and Decree
Granting Specific Performance at 2, 1 2, Add., Doc. 6.) The trial court ordered that the sale
take place "within such period of time as demanded by the Plaintiff, but not to exceed the date
of the expiration of the real property lease. . . ." (J. and Decree Granting Specific Performance
at 2, 1 2 , Add., Doc. 6.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
This Court should reverse the trial court's award of specific performance of the real
estate option to Shields because Shields failed to tender the purchase price, as required under
Utah Law. Shields alleged that the sale price of Harris' property should be $134,200.00 and
asked the trial court to order Harris to sell his property to Shields at that amount. Utah courts
have held that a purchaser seeking specific performance of a real estate contract must make a
valid tender of the purchase amount before the court can order specific performance, unless the
purchaser is excused because tender would be a futile act. Shields has not made a valid tender
of performance, nor does the evidence show that tender would have been futile because Harris
retained control of and title to his property and could have performed if Shields had tendered
the purchase price. Therefore, Shields is not entitled to specific enforcement of the Option To
Buy.
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In addition, this Court should reverse the trial court's decree which allows specific
performance to occur at any time prior to "expiration of the real property lease" because the trial
court awarded Shields a judgment inconsistent with the evidence. Shields prayed for judgment
conveying Harris' property to Shields pursuant to the terms of the Option To Buy. The trial
court held that the terms of the option were unambiguous and granted Shields' prayer.
However, the trial court also ordered that the closing date may not exceed the expiration of "the
real property lease." By so doing, the trial court added a term which is inconsistent with the
option and which is not in accord with Shields' requested relief. The only reference to a closing
date in the Option To Buy is the ability of Shields to exercise the option at any time during "the
course of the seven year lease." (Option To Buy 1B, Add., Doc. 1.) Harris and Shields never
entered into a seven-year lease. Nor does the Option To Buy reference the ten-year lease
entered into by Harris and Shields approximately three months after the option was executed.
Assuming that the trial court is referring to expiration of the ten-year lease as a closing date,
then the trial court is supplying a term not included in the option or requested by Shields. A
court of equity is bound to command present performance of acts in conformity with the
contract. Here, the trial court ordered Harris to sell to Shields either by a closing date which
passed prior to judgment or a date not in accord with the parties' contract.
Consequently, the trial court inappropriately awarded Shields specific performance of the
real estate option, and this Court should reverse that order by denying specific performance.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
OF THE OPTION TO BUY BECAUSE SHIELDS FAILED TO TENDER
THE PURCHASE PRICE

Shields' failure to make a valid tender of the purchase price for Harris' property
precludes specific enforcement of the Option To Buy. Before specific performance will be
employed by the courts on a contract for the sale of real estate, the purchaser must show that
he paid the purchase price or tendered it to the seller. Century 21 All Western Real Estate and
Investment Inc. v. Webb. 645 P.2d 52, 55-56 (Utah 1982). In Century 21. the Utah Supreme
Court found that
During the executory period of a contract whose time of performance is uncertain
but which contemplates simultaneous performance by both parties, such as the
Earnest Money agreement involved in this case, neither party can be said to be
in default (and thus susceptible to a judgment for damages or a decree for specific
performance) until the other party has tendered his own performance.
IcL
Utah's courts have clarified what constitutes a valid tender as follows: "In order to have
a valid tender, there must be 4a bona fide, unconditional, offer of payment of the amount of
money due, coupled with an actual production of the money or its equivalent.M Carr v.
Enoch Smith Co.. 781 P.2d 1292, 1294 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (emphasis added) (citing Zion's
Properties. Inc. v. Holt. 538 P.2d 1319, 1322 (Utah 1975)); accord Jenkins v. Equipment
Center. Inc.. 869 P.2d 1000, 1003 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). For further emphasis, the Carr court
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stated that "[i]t is not enough to simply inform the seller that the buyer is ready and willing to
perform the contract as planned." Carr, 781 P.2d at 1294.
The rationale for the tender requirement is that the trial court should be certain that if
the seller is ordered to perform, the purchaser will be able to pay. Cohen v. Rasner. 624 P.2d
1006, 1008 (Nev. 1981). In Cohen, purchasers contracted for the sale of two vacant lots and
construction of apartment buildings on each lot. The contract was contingent on the purchasers
obtaining the maximum obtainable loan and the sellers carrying the balance. The purchasers
assumed a loan and obtained a building permit on one of the lots. On the second lot, the
purchasers applied for a loan, which was never processed, and failed to apply for a building
permit, which later became unobtainable when Carson City imposed a moratorium on
construction.

The purchasers sought specific performance, which was denied because the

"buyers' assumption of one loan and their application for another did not constitute performance
which would entitle appellants to equitable relief because they had not shown their present
willingness and ability to perform their obligation under the contract." I i . at 1007. Even
though the purchasers in Cohen did begin financial arrangements for the purchase of real estate,
their failure to complete the financial arrangements before seeking specific performance
precluded their relief.
In Carr. the plaintiff entered into an earnest money agreement to purchase a home to be
built as part of a housing development and paid $1,000.00 as a down payment. Without any
notice to the purchaser, the seller revised the construction of the home to make it suitable for
11

use as a model home by a real estate agency and returned the purchaser's earnest money deposit.
Whereupon, the purchaser had his attorney send a letter to the real estate agency, which
expressed the purchaser's intent to perform under the contract. In response, the seller informed
the purchaser that the seller considered their agreement to be terminated by the purchaser's
failure to obtain a loan for the residence. Then, the purchaser sued for specific performance,
seeking to force the seller to convey the home to the purchaser, rather than allowing the
residence to be used by the real estate agency as a model home. The purchaser based his action
upon two arguments: (1) the purchaser did make a valid tender by his letter expressing his
intent to perform the contract; and (2) the purchaser argued that the tender requirement was
excused because the seller had repudiated the contract by committing the home for use as a
model home.
Both the trial court and the appellate court found no merit to the purchaser's first
argument because the purchaser failed to satisfy his tender obligation by simply serving a notice
of his willingness to proceed. Carr. 781 P.2d at 1294. The Carr court explained that Mthe
requirement of a tender is well-established," and for a valid tender, the purchaser must
unconditionally offer payment of the money due, plus actually produce the money. IcL The
Carr court determined that the purchaser's letter expressing his intent to perform the contract
tf

at most expressed a desire on the part of Carr to go forward. . . [and] cannot be viewed as

satisfying the tender requirement." Id,
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Carr's second argument, that tender was excused, also failed. Utah courts recognize that
tender may only be excused where a party demonstrates by "reasonably plain and clear"
evidence that tender would have been a futile act. Id. at 1295. The Carr court explained the
rule of law as follows:
[t]he familiar rule that the law does not require one to do a vain or useless thing
excuses the making of a formal tender which would otherwise be required, where
it is reasonably plain and clear that if made, such a tender would be an idle
ceremony and of no avail, as where it appears that a tender, if made, will be
refused for some reason unrelated to the tender or its sufficiency. . . .
Id. (citations omitted).
In Carr. the evidence showed that although the seller allowed a real estate agency to use
the house as a model home, such use did not place it beyond the seller's control. The seller did
not convey title, and no evidence suggested that the alterations in the construction of the home
could not have been corrected for the purchaser's use. IcL The Carr court held that from this
evidence, "the record is not so 'reasonably plain and clear' as to demonstrate that tender would
have been a futile act." IcL Based on the evidence before the court, the seller could have
performed his obligations had the purchaser tendered the balance of the purchase price. Whether
the seller would have performed or even wanted to perform was irrelevant. The court only
focused on whether the seller was capable of performing had the seller produced the money in
conjunction with the tender offer. The Carr court concluded that the purchaser's duty to tender
was neither performed nor excused; therefore, the purchaser was not entitled to specific
performance. Id
13

The Carr case closely parallels Harris' case. In both cases, the parties contracted for real
estate. In the Carr case, it was pursuant to an earnest money agreement, and in Harris' case it
was pursuant to an option. In addition, both purchasers had their attorneys inform the sellers
that the purchasers were ready, willing, and able to perform the contracts. Nevertheless, both
purchasers failed to actually pay any purchase money. In Carr. the purchaser did not tender
payment either before or after construction of the home. In Harris' case, although Shields
obtained appraisals to figure the purchase price, Shields failed to unconditionally offer payment
of the purchase amount and produce that amount of money due or its equivalent.
Then, in both cases, the evidence failed to demonstrate that tender would have been
futile. In Carr. the evidence showed that the realty was not placed beyond the control of the
seller. The use of the home as a model was at the pleasure of the seller, the seller had not
conveyed title, and any corrections in construction could have been appropriately made. Even
though the seller refused to convey the residence when requested to do so by the purchaser, the
seller still was capable of performing; he retained title and the construction was finished. In
Harris' case, Harris had not conveyed title, Harris retained control of the land, Harris had not
terminated the lease with Shields, and Shields continued to farm the land. Although Harris
desired to sell his property to Burton Dairy and offered to purchase Shields' remaining lease
term, Harris still retained control of the property, had not repudiated the contract, and would
have been able to perform if Shields had tendered payment, even though Harris, like the seller
in Carr. did not want to.
14

Moreover in Harris' case, the trial court did not follow the established law that a
purchaser must tender the purchase amount or show that he was excused from tender because
of the futility of such an act. In Harris' case, the trial court made no findings or conclusions
that Shields was excused from tender because such an act would have been futile. Rather, the
trial court found that Shields was excused from tendering the purchase amount "because the
formula for finalizing the purchase price could not be completed without the cooperation of both
parties as specifically set forth in the Option To Buy agreement."

(Findings of Fact &

Conclusions of Law at 4, 117, Add., Doc. 4.) Contrary to the trial court's findings, the option
does not require the parties to cooperate in obtaining appraisals; it only requires that appraisals
be obtained. (Option To Buy, Add., Doc. 1.) Nevertheless, under Utah law, the only excuse
for failing to tender is where the evidence is reasonably plain and clear that an actual tender
would have been a futile act. Carr, 781 P.2d at 1295. Like the seller in Carr, Harris has done
nothing in this case to excuse Shields' tender.
Because the Harris case so closely parallels the Carr case, this Court should similarly
decide that Shields' duty to tender was neither performed nor excused and Shields is not entitled
to specific performance.

15

H.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
INCONSISTENT WITH THE PARTIES' CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT

Shields is not entitled to specific performance of the real estate option because the trial
court supplied a term inconsistent with the Option To Buy.

In cases involving specific

performance of a real estate sale agreement, w[s]pecific performance may be granted only if the
parties' intent as to the essential terms of the agreement is clear." Barnard v. Barnard. 700 P.2d
1113, 1114 (Utah 1985). Then, when granting specific performance, "it is the obligation of the
courts to evaluate the equities of the parties and to formulate a remedy that seeks to place the
parties in a position as similar as possible to that which they would have been in had the
conveyance been made according to the terms of the contract." Eliason v. Watts. 615 P.2d 427,
430 (Utah 1980). Consequently, when a court decrees specific performance of a real estate
agreement, the court must
require the performance of some certain and specific act which ought to be
performed by the delinquent party, and it cannot enter a general decree that in the
future the delinquent party shall perform the acts required of him by his contract.
In entering a decree of specific performance, the court has no power to command
the performance of acts except in accordance with the contract.
71 Am. Jur. 2d Specific Performance § 221 (1973).
In the instant case, Shields petitioned the trial court for specific enforcement of the
Option To Buy. The trial court found that the "[t]erms of the option agreement were definite
and enforceable11 and held that the option was valid and enforceable. (Findings of Fact &
Conclusions of Law at 4, \ 13; 7, \ 2, Add., Doc. 4.) Therefore, the trial court was bound to
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interpret the contract according to the document itself. Reed v. Davis County School District.
892 P.2d 1063, 1064-65 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); see also Provo City Corp. v. Nielson Scott Co..
603 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1979) (stating "A court will not rewrite an unambiguous contract.");
Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd.. 618 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 1980) (explaining that WA court will
not enforce asserted rights that are not supported by the contract itself.11).
The Option To Buy, dated February 10, 1987, refers to a seven-year lease, which the
parties never entered into. Several months afterward, the parties actually entered into a ten-year
lease, which expires on May 1, 1997. The option does not refer to this ten-year lease, nor does
the ten-year lease refer to the option. The option, itself, clearly does not give Shields any right
to a ten-year option.
In ordering Harris to sell his property to Shields, the trial court decreed that the closing
date of the option would be pursuant to the terms of the Option To Buy, ffbut not to exceed the
date of the expiration of the real property lease. . . ." (J. and Decree Granting Specific
Performance at 2, 1 2 , Add., Doc. 6.) The trial court never clarified which real property lease
it referred to, and maybe with some justification. The trial court could not rule that the lease
referred to is the seven-year lease because no such lease existed. Nor could the trial court rule
that the lease referred to is the ten-year lease because the court found that the terms of the option
were unambiguous, and the option does not reference a ten-year lease at all. The obvious
problem is that the option, which was offered by Harris several months prior to execution of the
ten-year lease, by its terms has no connection to anything other than a seven-year lease.
17

Not only did the trial court order Harris to perform on a date that had already past, but
the trial court exceeded its authority in extending the closing date beyond that prayed for and
contractually agreed upon. The trial court held that the terms of the option were clear, valid,
and enforceable. By its terms, the Option To Buy was enforceable only in conjunction with a
seven-year lease that never existed. Accordingly, the trial court committed error in attempting
to tie the option to a lease not supported by the option itself. Thus, this Court should reverse
the trial court's decree of specific performance of the Option To Buy.

CONCLUSION
Shields is not entitled to specific performance of the Option To Buy because he failed to
satisfy a condition precedent set forth by Utah's courts which requires a purchaser to tender the
actual purchase money before specific performance is decreed. Shields' failure to actually pay
the purchase price of the real property to Harris precludes Shields from specific enforcement of
the option.
In addition, the trial court erroneously excused Shields from tendering the purchase
money based upon an excuse not recognized by Utah's courts and based upon an erroneous
interpretation of the Option To Buy. The evidence does not reasonably and clearly show that
if Shields would have made a tender of the purchase price it would have been a futile act.
Harris retained control of and title to his property and was capable of performing had Shields
tendered the purchase price. Furthermore, the trial court ordered performance of the option on
18

a date that expired prior to trial and on a date that the trial court supplied in contravention of
a contractual term in an unambiguous contract. Specific enforcement of an unambiguous real
estate option requires specific performance in accord with the contract terms, and this
unambiguous option references a seven-year lease, not a ten-year lease.
Based on the foregoing facts and arguments, Harris urges this Court to reverse the trial
court's ruling specifically enforcing the Option To Buy and deny specific performance.
DATED this

U> day of March, 1996.
CORBRIDGE BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN

James L. Christensen
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the <f day of March, 19961 caused to be mailed, by first class
mail, postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to the below
named counsel:
Richard K. Nebeker, Esq.
NEBEKER, MCCONKIE & WRIGHT
139 East South Temple, Suite 510
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

<-• C 6 J T
J&nes L. Christensen
attorney for Defendant/Appellant

2550\2\APPEAL\BRIEF.3

21

ADDENDUM

Option to Buy
May 1, 1987 Real Property Lease
Decision
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Order on Supplemental Findings
Judgment and Decree Granting Specific Performance
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DOCUMENT 1

tNTRT NO. 3 3 2 5 ! E 9 D A T E ££jz<Z3
TIME 3jJ*p~j ^QOY. &£!(— rAGb*3i3-3<fif
FEE %^J1
RECORKD AT REQUEST O F _ j J ^ . ^ i ^ ^
DBHJT

DUCHESNE COUNTY RECORDER

OPTION TO BUY

A.
L e s s e e , J o s e p h U). S h i e l d s w o u l d h a a , e t h i s S p e c i a l !•(. t i on
t o bu> s a i d r a n c h - f r o m L e s s o r M r " i 1 A . H ? r r i s t o r a
r e a s o n a b l e o r i c e t o be n e g o t i a t e d b •> -f i •• e • n d e p e n d e n t
p e o p l e , one man - f r o m t h e F e d e r a l l a n d Ban!* , o n e man t r o m t he
S o i l C o n s e r v a t i o n S e r v i c e i n P o o s e v e l t , U t a h o f f i c e , one
b a n k e r -from t h e F i r s t S e c u r i t y B a n k o-f U t a h l o a n dep a r t - m e n
R o o s e v e l t U t a h , o n e - f a r m e r i n t h e M > t o n , U t a h a r e a , a n d on
r e a l e s t a t e b r o k e r i n t h e M ' t o n or F o o = e " e l t a r e a .
These
-f i • • e p e o p l e w o u l d make a - f a i r s t u d - a t t h e t i m e o-f p u r c h a s
t o make an h o n e s t a n d - f a i r a p p r a i s a l o f t h e r a n c h .
M 1 1 +1
b i d s w o u l d be a d d e d up -for a g r a n d t o t a l a n d d i v i d e d b ' T I I 1 P
to arrive ^ ^ a s e l l i n g p r i c e .
P.
A s p e c i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n w o u l d b * g i v e n +o
J o s e p h M.
S h i e l d s i n t h a t $ 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 p e r y e a r M o u l d be g i v ^ n t o M a r d t h e
down p a y m e n t a t a n / y e a r d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e o-f t h e s e M e n v e a r
lease.
F o r e x a m p l e , i -f / o u c h o o s e t o b u y t h e s e v e n t h / e a r
o f t h e l e a s e $ 3 5 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 w o u l d be a l l o w e d as a d o w n p a y m e n t
t o w a r d t h e p u r c h a s e p r i c e o-f s a i d r a n c h .
S a i d p r i c e o-f t h e
r a n c h w o u l d be b a s e d on t h e a p p r a i s a l o f t h e - t i ^ e p e o p l e
mentioned in Paragraph A.
I f f o r e ' a m p l e , t h e a M e r a g e o+
t h e s e f i v e a p p r a i s a l s came t o $ r 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 , t h e n - o u c o u l d
a p p l y t h e $ ^ 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 as p a r t o f t h e down p a y m e n t .
The
b a l a n c e d u e w o u l d be S 2 6 5 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 .

n r " i 1 H 7 H a r r i s

Subscribed before me t h i s

It'

sK

y\/jjl**^tS^y

day of

\Jt4t\^tl
M ~

•- ~ — ~

n i l

^<y^\.

DOCUMENT 2

REAL PROPERTY LEASE
THIS AGREEMENT

entered into

this 1st

and between ARVIL A- HARRIS, hereinafter

day of May, 1987, by

referred to

as Lessor,

and JOSEPH W. SHIELDS, hereinafter referred to as Lessee, for and
in consideration of the

mutual covenants

hereinafter set forth,

do hereby agree as follows:

WHEREAS, Lessor

is the

owner of 320 acres of real property

located in Pleasant Valley, Duchesne County, State of

ULah, mGre

particularly described as follows:

TOWNSHIP 8 SOUTH, RANGE 17 EAST, U.5.M,
Section 21:
Section 27:
Section 28:

Together with

Southeast Quarter.
West half Northwest Quarter.
North half Northeast Quarter

all improvements

and appurtenances thereunto

belonging and 250 shares of the capital stock

in the Uintah

Basin Irrigation Company; and

WHEREAS, Lessor is the owner of an underground water system,
and seven wheel lines, all of

which are

now in

good condition;

and

WHEREAS,

Lessee

desires

to

with such water shares and personal

lease said property, together
property as

above described

from Lessor.

FOR AND

IN CONSIDERATION of the above, Lessor and Lessee do

hereby agree as follows:

1.

Lessor shal1:

a.

Pay all real property taxes on said property.

b.

Pay all water assessments in regard to said
property.

2.

Lessee shall:

a.

Furnish all said personal property, which includes
seven

water

returned to
lease,

in

lines,
Lessor,
as

presently,

which

good

which

lines,

at

the

of

condition

condition

etc. shall be

expiration

is

as

of this
they

are

good, reasonable

wear and tear excepted.

d.

3-

Pay all utilities, which includes electricity.

Regarding the water pumps and underground lines, Lessor
Lessor shall be responsible for the repair of the same.

This lease shall be for a ten (10) year term,
1,

1987,

through

May

1,

1997.

beginning May

The payments under this lease

shall be made in annual

installments

being

19B7, and continuing annually thereafter

due

on

May

1,

of

£13,000.00,

the first

during the ten year term.

Payment on

•* h e first of May each year, with a $0

Lessee

further

agrees

to

lease is

due and payable

day grace period.

deliver up the said premises to

Lessor, at the expiration of this lease, in as good

of order and

condition as when the same wis entered into by Lessee, reasonable
wear and
will

not

tear, damage
let

or

by the

underlet

elements excepted

said premises, or any part thereof,

without the written consent of
which consent

will not

and the Lessee

Lessor

first

be unreasonably

had

and obtained,

withheld.

Lessee notes

that 3/4 of property now needs plowed crops rotated and replanted
into alfalfa.

The

Lessor agrees

seed for the duration of the

to pay for 1/2 of all alfalfa

lease, which

can be

deducted from

the lease payment by the Lessor.

In case

of failure

to faithfully perform the covenants and

terms herein set forth, the defaulting party shall pay all costs,
expenses and

a reasonable

attorney's fee resulting in enforcing

this agreement or any right arising out of such breach.

Each

party

resulting

from

employees

or

hereunder
negligence

invitees,

shall
or

holding

be

responsible

misconduct
the

for

losses

of themselves, their

other

party

harmless

therefrom.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said parties have hereunto set their
hands and seals the day and year first above written.

LESSOR:

ARVIL A. HARRIS
LESSEE:

feEPH/w.

SHIELDS

STATE CF UTAH
CiA-MTY OF SALT LAKE
l-fftREBY CERTIFY THI9 TO BE A TKU5
AND CORRECT COPY OF THE ORIGINAL
W£IPWpNT. /
^
NOTARY FVBO& , ^ - 7 ,

RESIDING »N V Y / A v

. .

,

/ /

' n ^ / / •/. 1 /

JLX/Xi-ito / -£i 7 - <-/;;;

DOCUMENT 3

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
in and for Duchesne County and the State of Utah
Duchesne Department

JOSEPH W. SHIELDS,

DECISION

plaintiff

Civil No. 940800002PR

ARVIL A. HARRIS,

Judge John R> Anderson
defendant

RULING

The above captioned matter having come on regularly for trial the 17th and 18th days
of October, before the Honorable John R. Anderson, setting without a jury. Evidence
having been adduced and argument having been made and the court having taken the matter
under advisement now makes and enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and Decision:
FINDINGS
The parties to this law suit hereafter referred to as Shields and Harris entered into a
five (5) year real property lease un April 1, 1985. Because of the economics presented by
the condition of the property, substantial improvements were made at Harris's expense.
2. On ur about February 9, 1987 the parties mutually agreed to terminate the lease.
3. Harris was interested in selling the property or in obtaining a long term lease to
coyer his investment costs and Shields was interested in purchasing the property or in having
a longer term lease.
4. The parties being in conceptual agreement toward their expectations on or about
the date of the termination of the short term lease.

M/h

5. Shields and Harris are both held by this court to be above the standard of
consumers. To borrow from the uniform Commercial Code special recognition is given to
farmers as merchants and from (lie testimony adduced, Harris was an experienced and
successful businessman. This court will not hold the parties however, to standards of
knowledge required for real estate brokers or attorneys trained in the special areas of real
estate law.
6. Shields was faced with having to file a chapter 12 Plan of Reorganization in the
United States Bankruptcy Court at or near this time.
7. From the documents filed with the bankruptcy court, it is apparent to this court
that Shields intended to enter into a long term lease or to buy the property.
8. At or about the date of the filing of the chapter 12 Petition, Harris granted shields
an opLion to buy the property.
9. This court finds from the testimony adduced that, the option extended from Harris
to Shields was a * dangling carrot" to induce Shields to enter into a longer term lease.
10. The option given was therefore for a valuable consideration
11. Alter the dismissal of the Chapter 12 proceedings approximately 90 days after it
had been filed, Harris received from Shields an executed ten (10) year lease pursuant to the
evidence adduced and the exhibits received.
12. The option contract was not a mere continuing offer, but an interest in real
estate.
13. Terms of the option agreement were definite and enforceable and will be
construed against Harris who drafted the document. "Ranch" will include the water stock
according to customs and dealings of the parties.
Id. No evidence was presented \m Harris's counterclaim and therefore it should be
dismissed.
15. The ten year lease and the option agreement were not merged, therefore this
court finds that there is no provision for the award of attorney fees for enforcing the option
contiaa.
16. This court finds based upon the appropriate case law. and the facts adduced at
trial in this case that marketable title need not be such till actual date of closing.
17. Tender of a purchase price was not required under the circumstances because the
formula for completing die purchase price could not be completed without cooperation

1
between the parties. Because the parties were held to the standard of merchants good faith
and fair dealing will be implied in their transactions*
18. Since the 5th element of the determination of value was an impossibility the court
will not simply exclude its operation from the contract.
19. The court will try and construe the contract without re-writing the contract
reading in to the contract a requirement of good faith and fair dealing which is required
between these parties The court is determined that the sales price formula will be
determined as follows:
1. It will be the average of two (2) farmers and neighbors obtained by each
of the parties, Richens and Roberts.
2. Court will use the Federal Tand Bank appraiser of Mr. Warren.
3.

The court will use the First Security Bank value

4. The court will use die average of a real estate broker supplied by
each of the parties. Those numbers totaled equal $227,500 divided by four (4)
equals $197,000.00. The court will assign a value to the sprinkler system
which is removable from the property and not deemed fixtures to the eight
wheel lines of $8,000,00. Re: value of sprinklers lines, Plaintiff's testimony
is inconclusive and Wilkersons @ $27,000.00. With defendants at $10,000,
5.

Court will exclude the Burton Dairy Deal as
a) Not done
b) Not relevant to coniract interpretation.

20. Therefore, the Yalue of die property and the purchase price determined from the
contract is $207,000.00.

CONCLUSIONS
1. The counterclaim of Harris is dismissed.
2. The option agreement extended by Harris to Shields is valid and enforceable.
Harris must furnish marketable title al date of closing. The purchase price will be
$207,000.00. less credits and liens..

3. Judgment may be entered accordingly, counsel for Shields is directed to prepare
inclusive Findings uf Facts and Conclusions of Law and a Decree. Present the some to
counsel for Harris for approval as to form and present it to the court, whereupon judgment
may be entered.

Dated

J6

* i*Tl

, 1994.

lonorable John R. Anderson
copy to:
Richard K, Nebeker
James L. Christensen
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FILED
BCKTH OraTStCT COUfT
DUCHESNE CC. UTAH

Richard K. Nebefcer
Nebeker, McConkie & Wright
Attorney for Plaintiff
139 E . south Temple, Ste. 510
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7373

JUN 2 2 1995

BY

_x

OEPUVY

Oli'-^1:'*-*- C5/T.

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
»»

JOSEPH V. SHIELDS,
Piaintifr

i
t

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

l
1

Civil No. 940800002PR
ARVIL A. HARRIS,
;

Judge John R. Anderaon

Defendant.
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial on
j the 17th and 18th daye of October, 1994, before the Honorable John j
J, R. Anderson, presiding*

From the evidence presented and argument!

j; made at trial, the court rendered a memorandum "Dealsion" on the j
>| 24th day of October, 1994. Based upon the Court's Deoieion, with
r its accompanying Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the
:j parties hereto (hereafter, "Shields" and "Harris M ), by and through
|j counsel of record, now set forth the inclusive Findings of Fact and

is
j! Conclusions of Law;
r
J.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The parties to this law suit entered into a five

(5) year real property lease on April 1, 1985.

Because of the

20.,

Findings of Fact and Conelot ions of Law Caoo N O . O40800002W ?
Judge Johnft.Anderson j

economics presented by the condition of the property, substantial
\\ improvements were made at Harris' expense.

j

i:

!

!•

2.

On or about February 9, 1987, the parties mutually;

j agreed to terminate the 1085 lease.
3.

j

Harris was interested in selling the property or in '

obtaining a long term lease to cover his investment costs and;
; Shields was interested in purchasing the property or in having a!
longer term lease.
4•

]

The parties, being in conceptual agreement toward j

their expectations on or about the date of the termination of the I
:

1985 lease, determined to enter into a long-term lease. ThiB long ;
i

i'

; term lease, (for a period of ten years), was entered into between;
#

;« shields and Harris on or about the let day of Hay 1987.
Ij

j
4

5.

Both Shields and Harris are found to be above the j

\\ standard of consumers as designated by the uniform Commercial Code. |
;

Harris is found to be an experienced and successful businessman, j

•;, The parties are not however to be held to the standard of knowledge j
'• required for real estate brokers or attorneys trained in the j
; special areas of real estate law*
6.

j

At or near the time of entering the new lease with!

i Harris, Shields was faced with having to file a Chapter 12 Plan of j

204

Finding* of Fact and Conclusions of Low I
C A M No. 94080D0Q2W
Judo* John 1. Andtrton

Reorganisation in the United States Bankruptcy Court.
7.

!

From the documents filed with the Bankruptcy Court, j

it is apparent that Shields intended to enter into a long term j
lease with Harris ana/or to buy the property,
8.

I

At or about the time of the filing of the Chapter 12 ,

Petition, Harris granted Shields an option to buy the property. The j
"Option To Buy" agreement was given in writing, executed by Mr. j
Arvil A Harris and delivered to Mr. Shields.
9.

The "Option To Buy" granted by Harris to Shields I

constituted an incentive or a "dangling carrot" to induce Shields j
to enter into the ten year May 1, 1987 lease with Harris, Shields j
relied upon the option TO Buy when entering the ten year lease. j
10.

The "Option To Buy" agreement was given for valuable •'
i

consideration,
11.

j
After the dismissal of the Chapter 12 proceedings ;

(approximately 90 days after it was filed), Harris received from!
Shields the executed ten (10) year lease. Shields commenced farming
the leased land and made all payments to Harris pursuant to the
lease.
12.

The

"option To Buy" contract was

not

j
a mere'
i

continuing offer, but an interest in real property belonging to I

3

20,

Flndtagt of Fact wnti Conclu«iarw of le*
C I M NO. 940800002PR
Juefee John R. And»r«flo

Shields•
13.

Terms of the option agreement were definite and «

enforceable and are construed against KarriB who drafted the
document.

The tern "ranch" ae used In the lease ana or option, t
i

includes the water stock according to the customs and dealings of i
the parties*

i
14. No evidence was presented on the Harris Counterclaim ;
and the same is to be dismissed.
15. The ten year lease and the option agreement were not ]
merged and therefore/ there is no provision for the award of '
attorney fees for enforcing the option agreement.
16.

Based upon appropriate case law and the facts

j adduced at trial in this case, marketable title need not be j
j, available until the actual date of closing.
:|

17.

shields was not required to tender the purchase'

'j price under the facts and circumstances of this case because the j
'• formula for finalizing the purchase price could not be completed i
, without the cooperation of both parties as specifically set forth 5
;

'i
1

in the Option To Buy agreement. Since both parties are held to the j
> standard of merchants, good faith and fair dealing is implied In
t
1

I

their transactions.

4

20E

Finding* of Pact and Conclueioc* of l«u j
C 1 M *©. 940800003* '

Judge John K, Anderson ,
18.

Because It was impossible to obtain an appraisal by

someone from the Roosevelt offloe of the Soil Conservation Service ,
(the fifth appraisal in the option formula for determining value i
and sale price), that element of value determination is excluded by I
the Court.
19.

The formula for price determination as set forth in
i

the Option To Buy agreement will be construed by the Court without
re-writing the contract. Based upon the requirement of good faith and fair dealing between the parties, the option agreement sales ;
price is found to be the average price at which the property was *
appraised, plus the value of the non-fixture sprinkler system, :
determined as follows:
a.

The

j
average

of

the

values

placed

on

the j

property by two (2) farmers and neighbors, Mr. Rlchens and Mr. j
Roberts, one each obtained by each of the parties, in the amount of j
$140,000.00

and

$280,000.00

respectively,

equals

$420,000.00, j
j

divided by two equals: s210.000.00.
|
b. The Federal Land Bank appraisal of S190r000.00. >
o. The First Security Bank appraisal of 6177,750.00. ;
!

d. The average of the values placed on the property I

by the two (2) real estate brokers' appraisals, each party having'
5

2C-<

FfndfngA of Fact and Conclusion* of lau [
C u e No. W 8 0 0 0 0 3 P * ;
Judge John ft* Anderson j

provided one of the brokers is $245,500,00 (the Roberts appraisal]
;; aa given in oral testimony at court) and $160,000.00 (the Allred I
i

i

I.

4

,: appraisal) equals $405,500.00 divided by two equals 6202.750.00.
o.

The sum of the above appraisals is $780,500 j

J

$190,000.00 + $177,750.00 + $202,750) and when:

i

i

' ($210,000.00 t

I; divided by 4 that equals $195,125.00.
i

'
j

;:
f.
The value of the sprinkler system which is ;
i removable and not deemed to bs a fixture to the eight wheel lines
i

is the sum of

$8,000.00*
g.

j

The Burton Dairy deal is not included in the j

value determination because the deal was not completed and evidence i

!

!i
'; related thereto was not relevant to the contract.
j

;!
j|

j
'

!

20. The total value of the property and the purchase;
price to be paid pursuant to the parties contract is therefore the ;
sum of $202,125.00.

6
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Findings of Fact and Conelutlons of Law
Cooo No. 94080000** !
Judge John fU Ancferton !
i

21.

There exists some liens and encumbrances on the '

i

i

i

I

i title to the leased property Which will be removed at the expense !
• of Harris or in the alternative, deducted from the purchase price
lj
11 at the time of closing.
;|
22. The Plaintiff Shields is entitled to a credit on the
ji

jj purchase price of 35,000.00 per year for each year paid on the
[' lease pursuant to the terms of the option contract*
i

CONCLUSIONS OP IAW
i

1.

This Court has jurisdiction over the parties in the

»

i above-entitled matter and subject matter jurisdiction exists* The
•i real property which is the subject of this legal action is located j
\

*!

j| within the Eighth District Court of Duchesne County.
i\
2. The option To Buy agreement given by Harris to
rj
i*

\\ Shields is valid and enforceable.
3.

The Option To Buy contract vae not a mere continuing j

offer, but an Interest in real property belonging to Shields.
4.

Since both parties are held to the standard of

merchants, good faith and fair dealing is implied in their
transactions.
5. Harris must furnish Shields marketable title to the
7

20;,

Finding* of Fact and Conclusion* of Law j

C « M NO. ttttoooozftft ;
Judgt Joftn R. Andtrton j

property at the date of closing,
6.

j

The purchase price to be paid by Shields at closing j
i

is the priao of $202,125.00 lees all credits and liens.

!

I
7.

The Burton Dairy Deal is unfinished and not relevant!

to the option agreement.
8.
1

There having been no evidence presented

on the ;

Harris Counterclaim, the same should therefore be dismissed.
9.

i
1

r

Plaintiff is entitled to Judgment and Decree of ,
•
Specific Performance Ordering that the real property which is the '
subject of this legal action be sold to the Plaintiff by the i

r

i

j Defendant

on the terms and conditions

as set forth

in these j

Findings and
10. Conclusions.
Judgment may be entered for Plaintiff accordingly, jj

21G

finding* of Feet and conelutlona of L M
Judo* John R. Andtroon
i

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusion© of Law to James j
L. Christensen at CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN, 39 Exchange Place
euite 100, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, Attorneys for Defendant,
this /^-" day of June, 1995.

DOCUMENT 5

8TH DISTRICT COURT
DUCHESNE

•95 JUN12 AIO'40
Richard K. Nebeker
Nebeker, McConkie & Wright,
139 East South Temple, Suite 510
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7373

4-

Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

JOSEPH W. SHIELDS,
Plaintiff,

ORDER ON SUPPLEMENTAL
FINDINGS

v.

Civil No. 940800002 PR

ARVIL A. HARRIS,

Judge John R. Anderson

Defendant.
* * * * * * *

Pursuant to the Court's Motion, a post trial status
conference was held on the 25th day of May, 1995, between
the Court and the parties in the above entitled case. The
conference was conducted by telephone and participating in
the conference call was the Honorable John R. Anderson,
District Court Judge, Richard K. Nebeker, attorney for
Plaintiff Joseph W. Shields and James L. Christensen,
attorney fo£-Defendant Arvil A. Harris. The phone conference
was conducted by speaker phone and was recorded by the
Court's reporter•
The purpose of the status conference was to assist

counsel in concluding the preparation of the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law by clarifying several points in
the Court's written "Decision" dated October 24, 1994.
Counsel and the Court reviewed said Decision and the Court
referenced to his personal trial notes. Based thereon, and
pursuant to the records, files and exhibits in this matter,
and after discussion and argument by counsel, it was
resolved as follows and is hereby;

ORDERED
1. That the appraisal value on the subject real
property submitted by the witness Mr. L. Clark Roberts, is
determined to be the amount of $245,500.00. This is the
amount that he testified to verbally on the witness stand
and this amount varies from his written opinion. The sale
price as stated in the Court's

written "Decision" dated

October 24, 1995, shall be and hereby is amended to reflect
this L. Clark Roberts appraisal value of $245,500.00.
2. That the phrase, "less credits" as stated in
paragraph 2 of the Court's written "Decision" under the
heading "Conclusions" is hereby clarified to mean that the
Plaintiff is entitled to a credit of $5,000.00 dollars per
year for each year in which Plaintiff made a lease payment
2

to the Defendant Arvil Harris as outlined in the parties
option contract. This credit amount shall be deducted from
the sales price of the real property at the time of the
closing of the sale between the parties.
3. Counsel for the parties are to either agree upon the
Findings Of Fact and Conclusions of Law, or in the
alternative, submit their own respective Findings Of Fact
and Conclusions of Law to the Court for approval on or
before the 9th day of June, 1995.

Dated this

vr- day of June, 1995.

Honorable John R. Anderson

Approved:

Richard K. Nebeker
Attorney for Plaintiff

James L. Christensen
Attorney for Defendant
3

Certificate of Hand Delivery
I hereby certify to the above entitled Court that I
hand delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Order on Supplemental Findings to James L. Christensen at
Corbridge, Baird and Christensen, 39 Exchange Place, suite
100, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, attorneys for Defendant,
this l±T day of June, 1995.
^y^

V Richard K. Nebeker
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Richard K. Nebeker
Nebeker, McConkie & Wright
139 East South Temple, Suite 510
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7373
- . . - % . .

Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

JOSEPH W. SHIELDS,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT AND DECREE GRANTING
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

v.

Civil No. 940800002 PR

ARVIL A. HARRIS,

Judge John R. Anderson

Defendant•
* * * * * * *

The above entitled action came on regularly for trial before
the Hc^i^-li: Jciir. R. Anderson, District Court Judge of the
Eighth Judicial District Court, sitting without a jury, on the
17th and 18th days of October, 1994. Plaintiff, Joseph W. Shields
was present and represented by counsel, Richard K. Nebeker.
Defendant Arvil A. Harris was present and represented by counsel,
James L. Christensen. The Court heard the testimony of the
parties and their witnesses, examined the exhibits admitted into
evidence and allowed closing argument by counsel. The matter was
then taken under advisement and the Court issued it's "Decision"

memorandum, on the 24th day of October, 1994. The Decision of
the Court was thereafter clarified by that certain Order on
Supplemental Findings dated the

day of June, 1995. The Court

being fully advised in the matter and having filed its Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and having directed that a Decree
be entered in accordance with those findings and conclusions; now
therefore, it is hereby;

ORDERED. ADJUDGED AND DECREED
1. That the Plaintiff be and hereby is awarded a Decree of
Specific Performance requiring that the Defendant sell to the
Plaintiff the real property which is the subject of this action.
Said real property is fully identified in the Plaintiff's
complaint and is set forth on exhibit A attached hereto.

2. That within such period of time as demanded by the
Plaintiff, but not to exceed the c.zta of the expiration of the
real property lease, the real property shall be sold to the
Plaintiff by the Defendant on the following terms:
A. The sale price shall be $202,125.00, lawful money
of the United States of America.
B. The Defendant shall provide good and marketable
title to the property, free and clear of all liens and
2

encumbrances. Any unpaid liens or encumbrances shall be
deducted from the purchase price and paid to the respective
lien holder at the time of closing.
C. The Plaintiff shall be and hereby is entitled to a
credit against the purchase price in the amount of $5,000.00
dollars for each and every year in which the Plaintiff has
made a lease payment to the Defendant, as stated in the
parties option contract.
D. The parties shall select a local title company to
conduct the closing of the sale, whereupon the purchase
price less credits and liens shall be paid to the Defendant,
and a Warranty Deed covering the subject property shall be
conveyed by the Defendant to the Plaintiff.

3. In the event of the failure of the Defendant to close the
sale of the subject property as provided for narein, upon Motion
by the Plaintiff, an Order of Quiet Title shall issue from this
Court conveying all right, title and interest in and to tae
subject property to the Plaintiff, and such additional relief
shall be granted to carry out this Order and Decree.

4. The Counterclaim of Defendant Harris against Plaintiff
Shields shall be and hereby is dismissed with prejudice.
3

5, Each Party is to pay their own respective costs and
attorney's fees.

Dated this

?r

day of June, 1995.

. ANDERSON

! ! •

Richard K. Nebeker
Attorney for Plaintiff

James L. Christensen
Attorney for Defendant

4

Certificate of Mailing
I hereby certify to the above entitled Court that I mailed a
true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment and Decree
Granting Specific Performance to James L. Christensen at
Corbridge, Baird and Christensen, 39 Exchange Place, suite 100,^
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, attorneys for Defendant, this 3 ^ '
day of June, 1995.
^
i
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LJli ILL

Richard K. Nebeker

